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Juggling Competing Public Values: Resolving conflicting agendas in social 
procurement in Queensland  
 
 
Abstract:  
Organisations within the not-for-profit sector provide services to individuals and groups 
government and for-profit organisations cannot or will not consider. This response by the 
not-for-profit sector to market failure and government failure is a well understood contribution 
to society by the nonprofit sector. Over time, this response has resulted in the development 
of a vibrant and rich agglomeration of services and programs that operate under a myriad of 
philosophical stances, service orientations, client groupings and operational capacities. In 
Australia, these organisations and services provide social support and service assistance to 
many people in the community; often targeting their assistance to clients facing the most 
difficult of clients with complex problems.  
 
Initially, in undertaking this role, the not-for-profit sector received limited sponsorship from 
government, relying on primarily on public donations to fund the delivery of services. (Lyons 
2001). Over time governments assumed greater responsibility in the form of service grants 
to particular groups: ‘the worthy poor’. More recently, government has engaged in 
widespread procurement of services from the not-for-profit sector, which specify the nature 
of the outcomes to be achieved and, to a degree, the way in which the services will be 
provided. A consequence of this growing shift to a more marketised model of service 
contracting, often offered-up under the label of enhanced collaborative practice, has been 
increased competitiveness between agencies that had previously worked well together 
(Keast and Brown, 2006).   One of the challenges which emerge from the procurement of 
services by government from third sector organisations is that public values such as 
effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and professionalism can be neglected (Jørgensen 
and Bozeman 2002), although this is not always the case (Brown, Furneaux and 
Gudmundsson 2012). While some approaches to the examination of social procurement - 
the intentional purchasing of social outcomes (Furneaux and Barraket 2011) - assumes that 
public values are lost in social procurement arrangements (Bozeman 2002; Jørgensen and 
Bozeman 2002), alternative approach suggest such inevitability is not the case. Instead, 
social procurement is seen to involve a set of tensions (Brown, Potoski and Slyke 2006) or a 
set of trade offs (Charles et al. 2007), which must be managed, and through such 
management, public values can be potentially safeguarded (Bruin and Dicke 2006).  
 
The potential trade-offs of public values in social procurement is an area in need of further 
research, and one which carries both theoretical and practical significance. Additionally, the 
juxtaposition of policies – horizontal integration and vertical efficiency – results in a complex, 
crowded and contested policy and practice environment (Keast et al., 2007),, with the 
potential for set of unintentional consequences arising from these arrangements. Further the 
involvement of for-profit, non-profit, and hybrid organisations such as social enterprises, 
adds further complexity in the number of different organisational forms engaged in service 
delivery on behalf of government.  
 
To address this issue, this paper uses information gleaned from a state-wide survey of not-
for-profit organisations in Queensland, Australia which included within its focus 
organisational size, operational scope, funding arrangements and governance/management 
approaches. Supplementing this information is qualitative data derived from 17 focus groups 
and 120 interviews conducted over ten years of study of this sector. The findings contribute 
to greater understanding of the practice and theory of the future provision of social services.  
INTRODUCTION  
There is no question that the not-for-profit (NFP) sector has been a major contributor to the 
progress that has been achieved in many countries in terms of the delivery of education, 
health and other social services, which are argued to underpin a more socially inclusive 
society. Organisations within the NFP sector provide services to individuals and groups that 
government and for-profit organisations cannot, or will not, consider. This service provision 
in the face of government failure and market failure therefore acts as a social safety-net. 
Initially, in undertaking this role, the not-for-profit sector received limited sponsorship from 
government. (Lyons 2001). Over time governments have assumed greater responsibility 
through the provision of service grants to particular groups - ‘the worthy poor’ (Tierney, 1970; 
Tomlinson, 1977). The 1970s saw a further expansion of the government role and 
responsibility in terms of delivering and supporting social services (Walsh, 1993). While 
government undertook the mainstream services of public education, health and urban 
services, it also engaged in social procurement – the intentional procurement of social 
outcomes (Furneaux and Barraket 2011). Typically such purchasing has been from the not-
for-profit sector.In this way, government has had an arm’s length funding arrangement and 
therefore also an arm’s length responsibility for social services delivered via the NFP sector.  
 
The NFP sectors’ long and differentiated history provided the foundation for what is now 
considered to be a vibrant and rich agglomeration of services and programs that operate 
under a myriad of philosophical stances, service orientation, client groupings and operational 
capacities. As well as providing an important service arm, it also makes a significant 
economic contribution to the nation. The NFP sector in Australia is estimated to comprise 
8% of the workforce, contribute $43 billion to the national economy and the equivalent of 
another $15 billion through volunteers (Productivity Commission, 2010; The National 
Roundtable of Nonprofit Organisations, 2007).  
 
Despite its size, the significance of its social and economic contribution and the funds 
directed toward its operation, the NFP sector has largely been ignored as a specific target 
within the overall government reform agenda, apart from the incidental impacts of broader 
government changes. Recent reform foci, however, have brought the NFP sector to the front 
and centre of review driven by demands for greater accountability, productivity and efficiency 
of operation. The concerted effort at both the national and state levels to embed higher 
levels of accountability into the sector is most evident by the shift to outputs based funding of 
social procurement (Department of Communities, Service Improvement Measures, 2010). 
These public values of transparency and efficiency are often held to be at risk in social 
procurement arrangements (Bozeman 2002; Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002).  
 
It is reasoned that introducing output funding and reporting (and amplified monitoring 
arrangements), rather than relying on grant or outcomes based funding, will provide greater 
clarity on what is purchased and delivered. Business and other major donors, for example 
corporate entities, also increasingly want evidence of the effectiveness of NFP activities and 
have stated a funding preference for NFPs that can provide robust business cases for the 
investment they seek (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010). Alongside the aggressive 
pursuit of accountability a number of policies aimed at strengthening the capacity of the not-
for-profit sector (NFP) to deliver services to required performance levels have been 
introduced by state and federal governments. Central to this reform package are harmonised 
regulatory processes, the reduction of red-tape and greater transparency (The Third Sector 
Magazine, 2011; Department of Communities, 2010).  
 
The notions of transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, listening to public 
opinion, openness and balancing interests are critical in the social procurement arena 
(Bozeman 2002). One of the challenges which emerge from these multiple objectives, and 
the procurement of services by government from third sector organisations, is that pursuit of 
public values such as effectiveness, and efficiency can neglect other public values such as 
balancing interests and listening to public opinion (Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002). Indeed 
some authors argue that public values are ‘lost’ in social procurement arrangements 
(Bozeman 2002; Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002), although other authors suggest such 
inevitability is not always the case (Brown, Furneaux and Gudmundsson 2012). Instead, 
social procurement is seen to involve a set of tensions (Brown, Potoski and Slyke 2006) or a 
set of trade offs (Charles et al. 2007), which must be managed, and through such 
management public values can be potentially safeguarded (Bruin and Dicke 2006; Brown, 
Furneaux and Gudmundsson 2012).  
 
Conventionally, NFP organisations have been mostly small in size and largely 
operate from a voluntary ethos. In recent times, however, as a result of the policy 
changes which call for more business-like operating models, the social services 
sector has become increasingly populated by a set of larger NGOs, which are run as 
businesses (Lyons, 2001; Ryan, 1999). These larger organisations are able to draw 
on a wider pool of resources and capabilities than smaller organisations and are 
brought into the mix because of their significant capacity. Additionally, recent 
research has highlighted the importance of social enterprises, in social procurement 
settings (Barraket and Weissman 2009).  Thus there is a shift to more corporatized 
and commercial arrangements in the Third sector. Additionally, a recent study of the 
Australian social services sector indicates that in many service arenas, for-profit 
organisations now outnumber not-for-profit organisations (Australian Council of 
Social Services, 2006).  It is not clear how these for-profit agencies fare in terms of 
maintaining public values in social procurement delivery.  
The introduction of higher accountability standards, coupled with augmented competitive 
funding practices has seen large, for-profit providers enter the service space. Coupled with 
the previous initiatives, and particularly pertinent to the need to expand the public and social 
housing sector, has been a push toward the voluntary amalgamation of smaller services to 
secure greater scale and scope of resources and management capacity. Ryan (1999) 
commenting on the US situation, but equally relevant to Australia, has argued that the 
continued blurring of the distinctions between NFP and FP organisations will raise questions 
about whether NFP organisations can adapt to this new and more competitive operating 
environment without compromising the qualities that distinguish them from government and 
FP. These institutional arrangements further complicate the multiple objective and complex 
operating environment for organisations delivering social services procured by government.  
Drawing on evidence from a suite of reforms in Queensland, Australia, this paper examines 
the impact of the reform process, in particular the higher accountability requirements and the 
resulting ‘upsizing’ of the sector. The tension between different public values is observed, 
and a discussion of the unintended consequences arising from the complex environment 
advanced.  
 
The paper begins with a brief overview of the changes occurring within the social service 
sector in Australia. In the next section the methodology used to analyse case initiatives is 
delineated. The findings are then highlighted, analysed and discussed. Finally, a conclusion 
is presented. 
 
THE ‘DOWN-UNDER’ SERVICES HISTORY  
Australia was settled as a convict colony in which a military focused government was 
responsible for the administration and advancement of the settlement, including the health 
and welfare of convicts and military personnel (Painter, 1987). As the colonies became more 
established and increasingly occupied by free settlers and ‘native born’ persons, social 
problems such as poverty, disability and dislocation began to emerge (Kewley, 1969).  
 
Since the government at this time assumed little or no responsibility for the provision of 
social services, it was left to free settlers to make provision for themselves through their own 
social/familial networks and later through charity bodies and civil institutions. As a result of 
government inaction, gradually, in the early communities, loose networks of self organising 
voluntary organisations emerged to cater for the welfare needs of the free settlers. These 
initial networks of local benevolent societies were complemented by orphanages, refuges for 
‘fallen women’ and infirmaries, and asylums for the mentally ill (Brown and Keast, 2005).  
 
By the mid-1800s, the government recognised the inherent socialising benefits of voluntary 
institutions and eventually began to contribute small amounts of funding through sponsorship 
arrangements to those agencies accepting the principle of limited government support and 
responsibility (Tierney, 1970). Graycar (1979: 21) summarised the arrangement:  
 
Before Federation, social welfare problems were dealt with by religiously oriented charitable 
bodies, many of which received the sponsorship of colonial governments. The colonial 
governments saw their role as providing some limited resources to charitable bodies for 
them to do their ‘good works’. There was essentially, very limited government involvement.  
 
Emerging from this social entrepreneurship and arms length government regulation, was an 
array of small, specialist voluntary organisations, each reflecting its particular area of service 
interest, mission, and, often, religious denomination. This early pattern of relatively 
uncontrolled voluntary welfare provision, underpinned by a strong charity ethos and service 
model (Brown and Ryan, 2003), remained relatively unchanged until the end of 19th century 
when changing economic and social conditions led to an expansion of people needing and 
expecting assistance. This situation, coupled with a greater understanding of the causes of 
social problems and new ways of organising for them, resulted in government authorities 
accepting higher levels of responsibility for providing citizens with basic social support. As a 
consequence many of the services previously provided by the voluntary sector were brought  
under the ambit of the government. While a shift to government was apparent, a continued 
reliance on the market to produce the necessary share of wealth distribution meant that state 
provision of services increased after World War Two (Crawford, 1996), with the creation of 
the ‘welfare state’. Accompanying this shift in government welfare provision was an 
expanded voluntary sector aided, in part, by government grant funding arrangements.  
 
The expansion of the social services domain and budget and the failure of initiatives to 
address intractable problems led to wide agreement on both sides of the political spectrum 
that the continuation of the welfare model was no longer economically or morally viable 
(Emy, 1993). In attempting to rein in the size and cost of the welfare state many government 
services were subjected to market principles of competition and associated corporative 
practices. In Australia government (and not-for-profit) human services were initially exempt 
from the corporatist approach, since at first there were perceived to be few alternative 
suppliers in the market space and not all services lent themselves to commercial application 
or clear contract specification (Chalmers and Davis, 2001). In some instances, namely those 
services involving children and young people, there was also a reluctance based on moral 
principles to subject this vulnerable group to commercial practices (Chalmers and Davis, 
2001). Nevertheless, over time, in many jurisdictions, the use of various aspects and 
combinations of competitive methods has become an accepted feature of public service 
delivery including the social/human services (Earles and Moon, 2000).  
 
To counteract the fragmenting impact of competitive service models, both the NFP and 
government sectors (at all levels), entered into a revised integration phase, grounded 
principally in horizontal arrangements such as networks and collaborative endeavours 
(Keast and Brown, 2002; Reddel, 2002; Stewart, 2001) . In a recent twist to the integration 
reform and accountability agenda, government has turned to an old favourite - amalgamation 
- as a mechanism to link up ‘like’ organisations to reduce service administration costs while 
still achieving a level of consistency in service provision. Amalgamation is the combination of 
two or more organisations /units into a new agency or a subsidiary controlled by one of the 
constituent members (Craswell and Davis, 1993). The benefits of such an approach are 
duplication and overlap are reduced, through for example shared administration, co-location 
and closer alignment of outcomes, and thus efficient scale and scope can be achieved.  
 
 
For the most part, therefore, the not-for-profit sector has been historically exempt from a 
corporatist reform agenda, save for the indirect impact of reduced government funding. 
However, increasingly they have become the focus of directed scrutiny in terms of efficient 
and effective service delivery models and most recently subject to more stringent 
accountability regimes as conditions of funding. This is due, in part, to the fact that for 
government, and increasingly business sector funders, the view is that the NFP sector either 
is not delivering or is unable to adequately articulate the outcomes delivered. Relevant 
government bodies are frustrated that NFP agencies cannot accept the ‘changing economic 
and business circumstances’, which demand evidence of the effectiveness of funding 
provided (Productivity Commission, 2010). In the shadow of these reforms there is a growing 
fear by many social commentators that the vibrancy of the NFS, its numerous service foci, 
service ethos and its social ‘watch-dog’ function will be limited or lost (Taylor and Bassi, 
Ryan, 1999; Lyons, 2001).  Moreover, it is unclear how these reforms would impact on core 
public values such as transparency, and efficiency. While these are the intent of the policy 
reforms, it is argued here that the complexity of arrangements in the sector is likely to lead to 
unanticipated outcomes.  
 
 
CASE CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY  
This paper draws on data generated from eight case studies within and across the 
Queensland government and not-for-profit sectors between 2000 and 2010. These initiatives 
include: The Government Service Delivery Project; Service Integration Project; Chief 
Executive Officers’ Forum; Reconnect Network; Child-Safety Partnerships; and the 
Responding to Homelessness Strategy (R2H) (2008). These cases were located at different 
levels of operation: strategic, administrative/managerial and practice, allowing for variation in 
perspectives and experiences.  
 
Methodology  
A variety of data collection instruments including semi-structured interviews, focus groups 
and questionnaires (including network linkage survey) were used to construct the cases. The 
focus and type of questions remained uniform across all cases, enabling comparative 
consistency to identify both similarities and differences between case programs. The semi-
structured interviews tapped into the respondents’ expectations and experiences of the 
reform processes (including integration modes, accountability processes). While the focus 
groups provided greater detail on respondent experiences. The dynamic interaction made 
possible through the focus group process allowed for greater disclosure and for opinions to 
be challenged. All interviews and focus groups were fully transcribed, coded separately by 
two people working independently and categorised to distil key thematic areas. Leximancer 
was used as a supplementary textual analysis tool to confirm the manual thematic analysis.  
Finally, a comprehensive array of documentation (public policy and service reports, 
evaluations and academic publications) was examined. This mix of data gathering 
instruments allowed for results to be triangulated, with the findings from one tool testing and 
confirming the results of others. In total 17 focus groups and over 120 interviews and 
questionnaires were completed. The resulting rich data set provides the basis for the 
findings and discussions which follow.  
 
THE SOCIAL PROCUREMENT REFORM PROCESS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PUBLIC VALUES 
 
A number of implications for the reform process of social procurement and how this affected 
public values were found. These include accountability and transparency, as well as a 
number of consequences from ‘upsizing’ and amalgamations.  
 
  
Accountability and Transparency  
Accountability is a cornerstone principle of government, with government agencies and 
personnel, including ministers, arguably answerable to the constituency for the quality of 
funds spent. Accountability is described as “the duty to provide an account …or reckoning of 
those actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray, et al., 1996:38), and is a key public 
value which is considered to be at threat in social procurement arrangements (Bozeman 
2002; Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002).   
 
Respondents acknowledged the fundamental need for their decision-making processes, 
actions and outcomes to be subject to clear accountability processes, including transparency 
of the relationships between funding provided and measurable service outcomes, also 
suggested that it produces negative as well as positive consequences. As one respondent 
noted, the former (good works) were often “cloaked in the complexity of the system in which 
we [service providers] work”.  
 
In relation to the positive perspective, NFP service provider agencies mostly agreed that 
high standards of accountability, transparency and quality assurance were important to the 
continued good functioning of the sector. It was acknowledged that money from government 
“... comes with strings attached” and therefore there is an: “.... obligation to perform in terms 
of the agreement made”. The increased demand for accountability and transparency was 
welcomed by the majority of respondents, as is exemplified in the following statement:  
From my point of view, if we are funded to do something then we must do what we are 
funded for. 
 
This finding supports other which also found that transparency was not automatically lost in 
procurement arrangements (Brown, Furneaux and Gudmundsson 2012). Some of these 
people were saying however that they had concerns about the lack of transparency in the 
accountability processes – that (a) it was never made clear which organisation received 
which funding, and were responsible for which outcomes; (b) that the complexity of funding 
arrangements meant there was a lack of transparency in the government processes in terms 
of the decisions about who got what; and (c) that while the NFP were subject to more 
accountability, government was not transparent with own processes.   
However, for many the object or recipients of this accountability differed from government. 
For instance, most NFP agencies saw that they were first of all responsible to their clients, 
not government. It was suggested that this was something that government actors often did 
not know, or worse forgot or overlooked. Unless this apparent disconnect between the two 
foci of responsibility is overcome it will be difficult for government to gain commitment to the 
need for accountability. This raises the question in relation to public values, while 
transparency is valued; the literature is not at all clear about to which organisations should 
be transparent.  
 
The finding also points to the potential risks of the imposition of ‘corporate’ style 
accountability which requires more onerous reporting obligations that impinge on the limited 
funds available to agencies to provide services. For many NFP there was a real concern that 
current policy and service regime is antithetical to social work values. Leat (1988) also 
cautions that too great an emphasis placed on the limited target count type accountability 
regimes, without also addressing public benefit outcomes, would undermine the social side 
of social services delivery and threaten the very values which the NFP sector brings to the 
service delivery table: independence, flexibility, responsiveness and diversity. As Wapner 
(2002: 159) stresses overemphasis on accountability, unavoidably results in not-for-profits 
that “cease to be effective non-government organisations” (emphasis in original). A condition 
Wolch (1990) has termed as the ‘shadow government’.  
 
As well as cynicism about which, how and if outcomes are measured, there was a concern 
as to whether government is fully aware of the outcomes achieved. In one service network 
that had operated over a number of years, a view was expressed that government failed to 
recognise the good work that had been done in the past and the outcomes of earlier 
integrative arrangements. There is a palpable sense of disappointment and irritation by 
many NFP agencies that their ‘good work’ is not acknowledged and that they now must use 
scarce resources to account for what they have produced. This view was encapsulated with: 
“we have never had to ‘show cause’ to this level before: it is like we are not trusted”. 
Accentuating their discontent are the multiple reporting and accountability requirements 
necessary for different funding streams and levels of government and the lack of funding to 
assist with this task. Thus while transparency is a value, the way in which transparency is 
being required of the sector is not appreciated, as this does not take into account previous 
work and track record.  The sector also wants to be involved in the setting of accountability 
processes – thus extending current understanding of transparency even further.  
 
The lack of information available about the role and funded responsibilities of individual 
agencies was presented as a core accountability problem by NFP service providers. For 
many, there is a lack of transparency about who is paid to do what. This situation, it was 
argued, was exacerbated by continued funding changes, which required organisations to 
shift or fudge their functions so that they aligned with previous or preferred work. The 
consequences of this are set out below:  
 
We can’t keep altering our criteria not letting other people know. Everyone is really 
confused about what others are doing.... and some are clearly not doing what they 
should – they are cherry picking – and it places greater pressure on those of us who 
are left to pick up the work and if you can’t do it then the clients get angry.  
 
In this way, there was a clear sense of frustration expressed by many respondents that 
some of their service contemporaries were not performing as agreed. Over time this was 
considered to be very detrimental to the relationships – the trust and reciprocity – that 
provide the foundation for integration on the ground. There was also an understanding, true 
or perceived, that the new and amplified accountability process presented as an expeditious 
way for government to alter current funding allocations.  
 
They [funding body] are saying that it brings about more accountability and before 
they were saying that the way the funding agreements were done they couldn’t 
actually de-fund another organisation easily if things went really wrong.  
 
The reason why they were going to a new system, because if people are not 
performing it is easy to get the funds and give it to an area that is efficiently 
managing it. But it takes years and years to de-fund.  
 
Again, this was seen as both a positive and a negative consequence. Positive in the sense 
that poor performance is no longer tolerated, thus leading to overall improvement in the 
sector. Negative in that, rather than redirect the funds to other performing local agencies, 
there has been a tendency to engage big organisations. The assumption here is that larger 
equates with more accountability:  
 
It is easier for [name] to give the money to another agency. I don’t think they need to 
establish a new agency. There are many other services out there doing a good job 
and they are already in the system.  
 
These findings complicate our understanding of public values such as transparency, as they 
indicate that transparency is not a simply or one way process. Public values literature has 
tended to focus on the transparency of government to the public, or the organisation who 
has been contracted to government. These findings suggest that transparency as a public 
value needs to become more systemic, and also be attended to between organisations 
involved in service delivery as well as by government to agencies.  
 
When government overlayed new services, introduced new service providers into the 
existing network and increase the level of scrutiny they restructured the network along the 
lines of other regions, it was widely considered that this was a ‘slap in the face’ for the 
existing service and a failure by government to recognise the good outcomes of earlier 
integrative efforts. For service providers it was also evidence that government had failed to 
listen to their recommendations and did not understand that a system successfully operating 
in one arena may not be appropriate in others: 
 
The government came and announced what was going to happen ... they didn’t really 
listen to what a lot of us were saying about what was needed in this area, and there 
was a tendency to replicate what was happening [elsewhere] ... It wasn’t really 
consultation at that time, it was really more information about what was going to 
happen, and there are clearly lots of different paths.  
 
This programmatic push down of a system not only ostracised existing service 
providers, but also set the foundation for adversely affecting existing relationships 
and causing suspicion of both government and the new players introduced to the 
sector at that time. Again, while the previous section focussed on transparency of content, 
this issue is more about the transparency of process. While government requires extensive 
reporting to its service providers, it has not been seen as being transparent in the process of 
bringing in a new system. Indeed the values held in the sector of collaboration are held at 
some jeopardy due to the way the new system was implemented.  
 
The ongoing changes in funding arrangements and therefore the nature of the services to be 
provided by participating agencies has caused problems for integration as there is a lack of 
clarity regarding which new entrants are funded and the exact nature of the services new 
entrants are funded to provide. Whereas existing service providers who have collaborated 
over many years have developed a common language and therefore an understanding of 
what is meant by the terminology used, as new entrants enter the field shared understanding 
is lost as language and terminology are used to denote different things. In the homelessness 
service sector, for example, a new agency was funded to provide an expanded suite of 
services for “early intervention”. This terminology was understood by existing service 
providers as meaning something different to what it was now intended to mean:  
 
No further back, their [new provider’s] definition is, and I think this is a problem ... 
because early intervention and prevention in [this network] means something 
different than it does in a medical model.  
 
Such misunderstandings about who is funded and for what purpose subsequently led to 
confusion and concern around accountability and about who was charged with providing the 
service that was thought to be funded:  
 
After a while this is how relationships break down ... because you really get frustrated 
and staff get annoyed ... but they don’t do what they have to do (other agencies) and 
you are the one that is supposed to be picking up all these things, and you can’t do it 
and then the clients get angry at you and everyone is ringing up and getting annoyed 
for something that you are expected to do but are not funded to do it. But I’m 
confused not [by] the money but about the purpose of the money, It is reactive, it 
doesn’t seem to be anything different to what we have been doing for the last 
however long and we haven’t been able to change anything in the past and we just 
keep doing the same things and that just confuses me a lot and sometimes I’m just 
amazed - a new program’s started up and I think why?  
 
In this instance, there is perceived to be a lack of accountability or at least transparency by 
funding agencies, particularly government. It was considered that a stronger engagement or 
communication between government and service providers might prove useful as a 
mechanism to increase the level of understanding among both sets of actors. That is, by 
including the NFP people in the problem identification and solution there would be greater 
understanding of the restraints of government (and vice versa) and therefore the rational for 
the reform, as well as the potential for more mutually agreeable solution. It has been 
suggested by several respondents that some of these risks, challenges and opposing 
outcomes could have been circumvented through deeper analysis and stronger dialogue 
between the involved actors.  
 
Some of the more forward-looking organisations acknowledged, however, that to be truly 
independent there was a need for the NFP sector to regroup and review its strengths and 
competitive advantage and become an independent force in its own right. In effect a return 
to the early days of limited government funding and, therefore more arms-length 
accountability requirements.  
 
These findings lend some complexity to the discussion of transparency as a public value. 
Transparency is seen as more of a systemic value which should be implemented in a 
multiple directions – to government, by government, to nonprofits and from nonprofits. 
Additionally, there needs to be transparency in process as well as content of decisions being 
made, not just the reporting of outcomes. However, there is a consistent theme that lack of 
transparency leads to a lack of trust and a level of cynicism, particularly in service delivery 
organisations. This also points to the multiple layers of transparency to which NFP are held 
responsible.  
 
Upsizing  
A common theme emerging from the study was the concern by smaller agencies at the 
growing prominence of larger, for-profit agencies in the sector. These organisations are 
larger and able to draw on a wider pool of resources and capabilities than smaller 
organisations and are brought into the mix because of their business like functioning and 
capacity, and therefore more sophisticated accountability regimes. Smaller organisations 
within some service networks observed that government appeared to be favouring the 
inclusion of larger agencies into service provision arrangements and placing them in 
administrative positions acting in a pseudo-government capacity.  
 
Government prefers these big organisations, because they are structured the same 
as government; they operate the same way. The reasoning is that the bigger ones 
will meet the requirements for stronger corporate accountability and will have staff 
that can monitor these processes.  
 
The inclusion of larger for-profit organisations into the service mix has led to tensions. Firstly, 
smaller organisations considered these large NGOs as being hierarchical and that their 
participation in service activities, particularly network and coordination group meetings, 
resulted in an uneven sharing of information around funding and the types of services each 
provided.  
 
When you are sitting around the table talking about things and planning actions, the 
small non-government agencies … are very open … they tell you everything about 
their organisation including the funding they get and then you get the larger 
organisations … they can’t necessarily be [open] … [they] can’t talk about the funding 
because they don’t know , so they can’t actually participate.  
 
The tendency for large organisations to be headquartered in capital cities meant that 
staff was often unable to participate fully in local decision making processes. This 
causes difficulties in terms of immediate decision making and resource allocation 
and was seen to be problematic to local level integration. 
To tell you the truth, I do have a problem when very big organisations come in. 
Because a lot of times they [new agencies] don’t really have an understanding of the 
sector at all... They are not connected and don’t act as part of our network.  
 
Additionally, large for-profit NGOs were considered to be taking work away that could be 
done by existing NFP.  
 
I don’t know that they need to establish another agency; you know there are other 
service providers who are doing a good job and should be given the opportunity.  
 
Further, the larger ‘new’ organisations were argued to be undertaking functions that did not 
add value to the existing network. Existing network participants commented that rather than 
contributing add-on services large new providers were implementing new services in which 
they had little experience and with limited knowledge of how the system operated. This has 
meant that existing services have had to step in to help out, which has placed a higher work 
load on the existing agencies without financial recommence.  
 
Issues of accountability were also raised. Some existing service providers suggested that 
these larger NGOs were able to attract funding because they had the capacity to write 
“beautiful applications” which they knew they were unable to deliver on. Rather than adding 
value to the service system, it was considered that new providers were having a negative 
impact on outcomes, including acting as a fragmenting element:  
 
Bringing in new players [to a sector that is already struggling], who have never been 
in the homelessness sector and that probably was one of the things that didn’t help.  
 
The data, particularly the network maps for homelessness and child safety service systems, 
confirms that it was the combination of size and new entry into the service provision network 
that created tensions in relationships. Several networks already consisted of long-serving 
providers that were often offshoots of large NGOs but which featured significantly in the 
centre of the network maps and were highly connected to other agencies. These 
contradictory findings suggest that it may not be merely the size of the organisation that is at 
issue, but rather how that organisation is structured in terms of devolution. Some large 
religious organisations, for example, created subsidiary organisations that operated relatively 
autonomously in the service system meaning that they were seemingly considered not to be 
subject to the same rigours of bureaucracy that some of the new service providers were 
considered to operate under. The combination of this mix of bureaucratic and flatter 
structured organisations; confusing terminology and the perceived lack of expertise of new 
service providers not only was considered unhelpful and rather detrimental in causing on-
going disruption to services as new actors were ‘brought up to speed’:  
 
One thing they have realised is that when a brand new organisation it takes about 
eighteen months for that organisation to settle down, you know to get everyone to 
know the system and how it works – by that time the rest of them are so stretched 
and strained that it immediately sours any working relationship  
 
There was a mix of responses in terms of how well existing NFP welcomed and integrated 
the newer agencies into their service systems. One network, although acknowledging a 
sense of ‘slight resentment’ nonetheless made significant efforts to link the newcomer to the 
core services and provided administrative and service support until it was able to become 
fully operational. At the other end of the continuum, some new bigger entries to 
communities, noted that they were ‘actively’ closed out of the local service network despite 
numerous attempts to engage: making it very difficult for the agency to fulfil its obligations. It 
was acknowledged on both sides (small and big) that some effort to ‘broker’ or ‘facilitate’ 
their entry may have ‘smoothed over’ the initial hurdles. A further factor undermining the 
relationships between these agencies, at least in two case sites, was the funding competition 
that had transpired previously for the programs. In these cases, several smaller long term 
agencies had worked together to develop a collaborative program only to have the ‘idea’ 
and/or the funding transferred to a new larger provider. Although, not spoken about openly 
these actions have manifest in a core sense of disregard that undermines working 
relationships between these agencies and government, which spills over to the emergent 
providers.  
 
There was also a concern expressed by several NFP that the ‘bigs’ have sufficient 
organisational slack and spare resources to be able to withdraw from a region, if their 
initiative proved to be financially unviable. Examples were provided where this withdrawal 
has occurred causing a loss of the service to the community. The fear that the large 
organisations were introduced to squeeze out the smalls was quite prominent and was 
occasionally expressed in terms of an acknowledged ‘conspiracy theory’. While this was 
often expressed with a tone of humour, there was nonetheless an underpinning belief in the 
truth of the position.  
 
So, while we might laugh and talk about conspiracy theories, there is a strong sense 
among many of us that that the ‘old’ agencies were staid and not progressive and the 
desire was to move us on’.  
 
It is clear that the greater inclusion of larger, more business-like service agencies has 
resulted in a shake up in the NFS. While in part, this was likely unintentional, there is some 
evidence of a strategic effort to deliberately unsettle what was seen by government as 
‘entrenched thinking’ of the traditional NFP and open them to the growing demands for 
change.  
 
From a public values perspective these findings point to some issues beyond transparency. 
Public values such as balancing interests, and listening to public opinion do not appear to 
have a high regard. Instead it would appear that the focus has been on efficiency and 
effectiveness, rather than a more robust and wholistic approach to service delivery.  
 
Amalgamation  
In addition to the introduction of larger organisations to the service mix, there was also a 
push for smaller agencies to join forces through processes of amalgamation and other forms 
of mergers. It has been argued that the current diversity and broad scope of services is not 
an effective system and, as such, both individual agency as well as government objectives 
can be compromised. The rationale for this policy agenda is centred on the search for 
efficiency by bringing related services together makes them more cost effective, more 
accessible and more efficient. The agenda is clearly set out by the New South Wales 
Government:  
 
Service integration through amalgamation and common management of agencies 
addresses these challenges by bringing related services together in a way that 
makes them more convenient, more accessible and more effective. Resources are 
focused on the real problems the public face – not just those a particular agency is 
set up to address. Activities are better coordinated. In addition, tax dollars are used 
more efficiently, with fewer resources wasted on redundant activities, unnecessary 
services and partial solutions leading to more effective government performance.  
 
These sorts of policy agendas, highlight that the public values of efficiency and effectiveness 
are being driven to the fore, at least in terms of government objectives.  
 
The benefits of such upsizing via amalgamation were acknowledged by some respondents, 
including “tapping into the potentials of scale and scope” for example, sharing management 
committee members; participating in joint training and other up-skilling actions. Conversely 
the potential for dominant groups within amalgamations to control other, less powerful 
partners was also identified. Craswell and Davis (1993) highlighted a similar issue in relation 
to government departmental amalgamations in the 1990s and commented that it negatively 
impacted on service flexibility and good decision making. Moreover, there was also strong 
concern expressed that these benefits would come at the cost of a diverse and vibrant 
sector, the very attributes that have made the NFP sector a viable ‘alternative’ and ‘safety-
net’ for government for many years (Ryan, 1999; Lyons, 2001; Wolch, 1999; Mandell and 
Keast, 2008; Saunders, 2009).  
 
It was noticeable that several networks of agencies have sought to achieve 
integration and efficiency through the application of alternative strategies to 
amalgamation. The Reconnect Program and the Gold Cost Homelessness 
Networks, for example, have both turned to incorporation as a substitute approach in 
response to government ‘policy and funding pushes’. The Reconnect Network 
became incorporated in 2004, following strong policy pressures from the Queensland 
state government for agencies to become ‘more collaborative’. Although seemingly 
falling in with the government agenda it was explicitly stated by members of this 
network that they were adopting a collaborative approach despite the goals of 
government. Further, rather than being ‘tools of government’ and adopting 
government’s model, they were going to develop a collaboration model that worked 
best for their situation.  
And so we moved to this new collaborative model, not because government required 
this and made it a condition of funding. We did it because it was the right thing to do. 
We also moved early, to make sure that we controlled what it looked like, how it 
worked and what it stood for.  
 
This points to a lack of strategic level understanding of the local system by higher level 
bureaucrats, and further highlights the disconnect between the two sectors in terms of 
processes to meet mutual goals. It also highlights the NFP sectors understanding of the 
array of integration modes available and the need to match these fit-for-purpose (Keast, 
Brown and Mandell, 2007), rather than following a policy or programmatic fad or fashion 
(Adams and Hess, 2001).  
 
All of this suggests that there is a lack of connection at the level of public values. While 
government has focussed on issues of efficiency and effectiveness, the way that these 
reforms have been implemented will not automatically lead to those outcomes. The need to 
balance public values so that competing interests are acknowledged, that there is openness 
and a willingness to listen to options seems to be jettisoned in many cases in preference for 
a more instrumental approach to social procurement.  
 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The history of the relationship between government and the NFP sector in Australia is one 
that led to an environment wherein for many years government was remote from the 
provision of social services leaving the main responsibility to the NFP sector. This meant that 
NFP organisations were able to operate relatively autonomous from government resulting in 
a vibrant NFP community consisting largely small organisations working close to the source 
of social issues. As a consequence the NFP sector has evolved to comprise a diverse 
agency and programmatic set addressing a wide multitude of needs and desires. The sector 
has been prized for its independent spirit, communitarian ethos, its advocacy function and 
‘watch-dog ’role for the rights of the more vulnerable in society. The new environment has 
seen a withdrawal of much of its operating autonomy. There is no longer the arms-length 
arrangements experienced in the past. This is increasingly being replaced with a shift to 
firstly ‘control by grant funding’ and more recently to greater use of formal contractual 
arrangements.  
 
One of the difficulties, as illustrated by these case studies, is that government has not been 
able to communicate or engage with small NFPs to explain the rational for the reforms and, 
in so doing, to bring the NFP more on-board. The NFPs therefore embraced the idea of a 
conspiracy theory which prevented them from recognizing all of the positive aspects of the 
reforms proposed. In addition, there appears to be a lack of capacity building initiated on in 
to assist the NFPs to prepare their organisations for the changes needed, or to locate 
alternative sources of funding.  
 
There is a tendency for government to think that reform means relying on bigger 
organizations to more efficiently carry out social service functions. This is due, in part, the 
ability of bigger organisations to present their outcomes in more corporatist ways. There are 
three major difficulties in this effort.  
 
First, bigger organizations will only stay the course if it is economically viable for them to do 
so. When it is no longer viable, they will pull out of the system. The implications of this action 
are that remaining NFPs are obliged to take up the service shortfall (often without 
recompense) otherwise clients will be left unsupported. Second, bigger organisations, often 
not a part of the ongoing  relationships established within the NFP networks, have great 
difficulty fitting into these ongoing networks. As such, they remain at an armsarm’s length in 
terms of the joint decision-making that is going on. Finally, bigger organizations have to 
answer to their parent organization’s direction. For large type of organizations this means 
that instead of being able to make decisions based primarily on meeting needed local 
issues, they are instead bound by a more generalised directive that does not necessarily 
apply at the local level.  
 
In terms of public values then, there does seem to be a focus on efficiency and effectiveness 
by government. Ironically, a lack of understanding of the sector, or at best a simplistic 
understanding of the sector, has led to a strong engagement with the large organisations 
and a lack of engagement with smaller organisations. Consequently, the public values of 
listening to public opinion, openness, and balancing interests have not been attended to 
strongly.  
 
The current reliance on economically orientated measures of size and tangible impact 
undervalues the broader social contribution of the voluntary and community sector. Many of 
the outcomes delivered by the NFP are intangible, for example, re-locating children with 
families, and it is difficult to place a monetary assessment. Further, by retaining an 
individualistic organisational focus such measures fail to capture the benefits of cross-
organisational work, the community building element which, interestingly, is sought after for 
social leverage by government.  
 
The study has highlighted a growing dilemma for both government (and corporate) and the 
NFP sector. The economic environment is one of constraint and necessarily requires 
evidence of value of money provided. The NFP sector, while acknowledging the need for 
accountability and change, operates under different premises in which accountability is first 
to community or clients (itself a powerful regulator). The combination of accountability and 
upsizing presents as a genuine challenge to the ongoing viability of the NFP sector in its 
current form. There is no doubt that this sector should not be immune from review and 
reform. However, such an undertaking should occur jointly and be sensitive to the intangible 
and well as tangible contributions made. Further, forward strategic thinking should occur to 
ensure that unintended consequences don’t override the positive. As a start however, a 
communication strategy, in the form of genuine dialogue has been presented as one to 
bridge the accountability and reform divide. That is, NFP need to articulate better what they 
do and government need to engage more deeply with the NFP to shape the reform agenda 
and provide the rationale for actions taken. An alternative approach is for NFP to either take 
greater stock of their contribution and enter into stronger negotiation for funding, or return to 
their earlier self funded and independent approaches.  
 
For government, there is a clear call to consider the wider implications of a narrow focus on 
efficiency and effectiveness in terms of the fundamental principles of social procurement. In 
particular the embracing of a primarily commercial approach to service delivery by 
government, when seeking to engage a sector which operates from a more altruistic and 
collaborative mode of operation, great a number of disconnects.  
 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that a number of public values have been neglected 
(Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002), particularly openness, balancing interests, and listening to 
public opinion – at least by government. It is not clear that these public values have been 
‘lost’ (Bozeman 2002; Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002), as clearly the sector as a whole still 
holds these values and is actively seeking ways for them to be reinstated.   
 
Government would do well to consider that there are in fact a large number of policy 
outcomes, and that focussing purely on efficiency and effectiveness may be far too short 
sighted an approach. If, instead, social procurement was also implemented in such as way 
that a broader more engaged approach with the sector was undertaken, and one in which 
was more open, engaged, and balanced, then a number of the unintended consequences 
may well be averted. Such an approach would then need to acknowledged that social 
procurement involves a set of tensions between different public values (Brown, Potoski and 
Slyke 2006) and ways need to be found so that there set of trade offs (Charles et al. 2007), 
can be effectively managed, so that the more wholistic set of public values can be 
safeguarded (Bruin and Dicke 2006; Brown, Furneaux and Gudmundsson 2012). 
 
As these case studies have demonstrated these new relations between NFPs and the 
private sector and those between NFPs and government, present not only a challenge for 
NFPs and government but also for researchers studying these new types of relationships. 
One of the continuing concerns for practitioners and researchers in the future will be the 
problem of the loss of emphasis on the values and unique identity of NFPs. Future 
researchers will need to look at how reforms in existing systems may impact on the integrity 
and uniqueness of NFPs and what changes this will bring about in our understanding of 
NFPs and their continued role in society. Finally, the key issue that has been addressed in 
this paper is the fear that large NFPs are squeezing out smaller ones. One side of the 
argument is that there are too many small NFPs that are weak and inefficient. On the other 
side is the argument that the fact that NFPs are small is the very reason they can be closer 
to communities and serve them better. If they become large scale professional 
bureaucracies they will lose this unique edge. This debate will be of continuing interest in the 
future.  
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